The Relationship between Output and Unemployment with Efficiency Wages by Jim Malley & Hassan Molana
CENTRE FOR DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 




CASTLECLIFFE, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, KY16 9AL 
TEL: +44 (0)1334 462445    FAX: +44 (0)1334 462444    EMAIL: cdma@st-and.ac.uk 
www.st-andrews.ac.uk/cdma 






The Relationship between Output and 





University of Glasgow 
Hassan Molana 









We construct a stylised model of the supply side with goods and labour 
market imperfections to show that an economy can rationally operate at an 
inefficient, or ‘low-effort’, state in which the relationship between output and 
unemployment is positive. We examine data from the G7 countries over 1960-
2001 and find that only German data strongly favour a persistent negative 
relationship between the level of output and rate of unemployment. The 
consequence of this is that circumstances exist in which market imperfections 
could pose serious obstacles to the smooth working of expansionary and/or 




Keywords: Efficiency wages, effort supply, Kalman filter, monopolistic 
competition, Okun’s law. 




* Correspondence: Hassan Molana, Department of Economics, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, 
UK. Tel: (00)44-(0)1382-344375; Fax: (00)44-(0)1382-344691; E-mail: h.h.molana@dundee.ac.uk.   1
1.   Introduction 
In the last few decades, industrialised nations have been subjected to a variety of external and 
policy-induced demand shocks while simultaneously experiencing significant changes in 
their labour productivity and employment.  Meanwhile, governments have been concerned to 
maintain a balance between implementing those policies which protect workers against job 
losses (to reduce the hardship of unemployment) and those which restrain the unemployment 
rate.  However, as Lindbeck (1992) warns, unless we have a clear understanding of how such 
policies work, their implementation may produce unexpected consequences: "In the context 
of a nonmarket-clearing labour market, it is certainly reasonable to regard unemployment, in 
particular highly persistent unemployment, as a major macroeconomic distortion. There is 
therefore a potential case for policy actions, provided such actions do not create more 
problems than they solve. Experience in many countries suggests that the latter reservation is 
not trivial."     
  In this paper we focus on one such case by examining the relationship between the 
level of output and the rate of unemployment.  The common belief regarding this relationship 
is dominated by Okun’s Law which predicts that a fall in output growth is normally 
accompanied by a significant but smaller rise in unemployment.  This prediction and its 
policy implications are straightforward when output and unemployment exhibit a systematic 
negative relationship with each other beyond trend and cyclical variations.  However, they 
are not so clear if these variables happen to be positively related.  We therefore ask whether 
there are circumstances in which a rise in the rate of unemployment can lead to an increase 
the level of output, and develop a theoretical model that shows such a result can be obtained 
when labour and goods markets operate under certain (plausible) conditions
1.  The model 
allows for a distortion in the labour market through incorporating a variant of the efficiency 
wage hypothesis whereby involuntary unemployment gives rise to externalities that could be 
exploited by economic agents; price-setting firms use high or rising unemployment as a 
device to deter shirking.  The novelty of the variant used in this paper is that, unlike the 
existing models in which a worker’s effort level is discrete and can assume either a low or a 
high value, it allows a worker’s optimal effort supply to be a continuous function of its 
determinants.  These determinants are: (i) the net of tax income from employment relative to 
                                                 
1   Clearly, such departures from standard results are expected when models deviate from perfectly competitive 
conditions by allowing for some type of rigidity or distortion, e.g. efficiency wages, unionisation, wage 
contracts, unemployment insurance, etc.  For instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) focus on the effect of 
raising unemployment insurance within a search model and conclude that more generous welfare 
programmes can in fact raise output and welfare despite giving rise to a higher unemployment.    2
the unemployment benefit; and (ii) rate of unemployment in the economy.  In such 
circumstances the supply side is shown to exhibit a non-linearity which is adequately 
captured by a humped-shape relationship between output and unemployment rate.  It follows 
that the economy can, at any point in time, be in one of the three possible states with regard 
to the effort level.  The standard case, in line with Okun’s Law in which output and 
unemployment rate are negatively related, occurs in the ‘high-effort’ state where the 
economy can be said to be operating ‘efficiently’.  In this case, to raise the level of output in 
response to a rise in aggregate demand firms need to employ more workers.  The opposite 
case occurs in the ‘low-effort’ state in which the economy may be said to be operating 
‘inefficiently’.  In this situation a higher level of output can be achieved at a lower level of 
employment since firms find it more profitable to meet the rise in demand by inducing the 
workers to raise their (optimal) effort supply.  These two states are separated by a third, the 
‘threshold effort’ state, which corresponds to the peak of the humped-shaped relationship 
where the combination of employment and effort yields the maximum level of output.  In this 
sense, therefore, in the threshold effort state the economy may be said to be operating without 
any slack despite the existence of a positive level of involuntary unemployment
2.  
  To explore the extent to which the non-linearity predicted by the model is supported 
by evidence, we examine the relationship between unemployment rate and level of output 
using data from the G7 countries.  Our empirical analysis is based on estimating a state space 
‘local linear trend’ model using the Kalman-filter.  This approach allows us to account both 
for secular and cyclical variations and for changes in productivity of other factors, which do 
not explicitly feature in the analysis.  Our evidence suggests that whilst low-effort periods 
have occurred significantly within the sample, periods corresponding to threshold effort seem 
to dominate and only German data shows a strong support for more frequent occurrence of 
the high-effort case. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model and shows 
how the non-linearity described above emerges.  Section 3 explains our econometric method 
and reports the evidence for each of the G7 countries and Section 4 concludes the paper.  The 
Appendix outlines the derivation of the effort function used in this paper.  
 
 
                                                 
2   Other recent studies which examine the link between unemployment and productivity include Malley and 
Moutos (2001), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard (1998), Caballero and Hammour (1998a,b), Gordon 
(1997a) and Manning (1992).  However, none of these studies explores the link between unemployment and 
output arising from both labour and product market imperfections.    3
2.   The Relationship between Output and Unemployment:  Theory 
The main purpose of this paper is to throw light on the interpretation of Okun’s law with 
emphasis on the relationship between output and unemployment on the supply side of the 
economy.  More precisely, we wish to focus on the structural relationship between output and 
unemployment implied by the supply side when there are goods and labour market 
imperfection, and examine how such a relationship fits in with the general observation that 
output and unemployment are related to each other negatively beyond trend and cyclical 
variations.  In this section, therefore, we use the efficiency wage hypothesis to provide a 
simple theoretical explanation of the way output Y and unemployment rate u are likely to be 
related on the supply side.  Before outlining the theoretical model, however, it is helpful 
highlight the problem by considering at the outset the temporal aggregate production function 
which may be simplified to focus on the variables of interest, namely 
  ); , ( L q Y Y =     0, q Y′ >    0, L Y′ >    (1) 
which, at any point in time, traces the combinations of aggregate employment L and output Y 
for the corresponding level of labour productivity q.  Now, invoking the assumption that q is, 
ceteris paribus, determined by the level of workers’ effort and postulating that workers’ 
effort supply is positively related to the unemployment rate − i.e. the higher is u the larger is 
the effort supplied and hence dq/du>0; see, for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) − we 










L q ′ + ′ = ,   (2) 
to deduce the behaviour of sign of dY/du as u  varies in the positive unit interval.  In 
particular, because dL/du< 0 by definition, the relationship between Y and u on the temporal 
production function would resemble that depicted in Figure 1 below if, at very low levels of 
u,  (/) q Yd qd u ′  is sufficiently large and dominates  ( / ) L Yd Ld u ′  so as to make dY/du> 0.  In 
other words, it is possible that dY/du changes from negative to positive as the unemployment 
rate falls below a certain threshold, u .  In such circumstances, the interpretation of Okun’s 
law and its consequences for macroeconomic policy differ drastically depending on the 
prevailing rate of actual unemployment in relation to the threshold level u .  That is, unless 
u u > , the observation that a fall in Y is accompanied by a rise in u (and hence Okun’s law 
holds) could only have been caused by a shift in the temporal production function down 
and/or to the right.  As a result, the standard macroeconomic policies are unlikely to yield the   4
expected results as stressed by Lindbeck (1992).  More specifically, it is not certain that an 
exogenous stimulation of aggregate demand would lead to a reduction in unemployment.  
 
       
    To illustrate that Figure 1 depicts a plausible theoretical aggregate supply under the 
efficiency wage hypothesis, below we develop a basic model building on the work of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984) and Yellen (1984).  A number of studies have employed some version of 
the efficiency wage hypothesis to examine various aspects of macroeconomic activity.   
Examples can found in: Agénor and Aizenman (1999) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) on 
fiscal and labour market policies; Andersen and Rasmussen (1999), Pisauro (1991) and 
Carter (1999) on the role of the tax system; Leamer (1999) on specialisation; Albrecht and 
Vroman (1996), Fehr (1991) and Smidt-Sørensen (1990) on properties of labour demand; and 
Smidt-Sørensen (1991) on working hours.  In this paper we employ a standard version of the 
hypothesis which postulates that workers adjust their effort supply in response to the net 
income they earn from employment relative to the benefit rate they receive when 
unemployed, and to the threat of losing their job and remaining unemployed.  But rather than 
using a discrete choice between low and high effort levels we allow for the optimal effort 
supply to be a continuous function of its determinants.  
    Consider an economy in which the product market structure is monopolistically 
competitive and output is a CES bundle of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product.  












,   (3) 
where  yj and pj are quantity demanded and price of the variety, s>1 is the elasticity of 
substitution between any two varieties, and Y and P are the real aggregate demand and the 
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Figure 1.  The temporal relationship between 
output and unemployment   5
corresponding price level, respectively.  The latter are determined by the CES aggregators 
below where N is the mass of available varieties
3,    
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    Suppose that each firm produces one variety of the good using labour as the only 
input with an increasing returns to scale technology whose labour requirement in efficiency 
units is given by 
  jj j el y λ =+ ,   (6) 
where  j l  is quantity of labour input,  j e  is labour productivity and λ is a constant parameter 
reflecting the fixed cost of production (assumed to be identical across firms).  The increasing 
returns to scale, implied by falling average cost, therefore gives rise to the incentive for full 
specialisation from which a one-to-one correspondence between the mass of varieties and 
firms results.   
    We assume that labour is homogeneous and is perfectly mobile between firms.  A 
worker employed by firm j earns nominal wage  j w  and pays tax t, and the government 
provides an unemployment insurance scheme which pays b to each unemployed worker.  We 
also assume that workers’ productivity is determined by their attitude towards shirking.  In 
particular,  j e  is assumed to represent the optimal effort supply of a typical worker which 
depends on: (i)  the difference between net real wage and unemployment benefit, 
() / jj wt bP ω =− − ; and (ii) the extent of unemployment in the economy captured by the 
unemployment rate u.  We postulate the following effort supply function for a worker 
employed by firm j (an example of this type of effort supply function, which satisfies the 
following properties and is obtained when workers maximise their expected utility from 
work, is explicitly derived in Appendix A1) 
  ) , ( u e e j j ω = , (7) 
which is assumed to satisfy the following properties (subscript j is dropped):  
 
                                                 
3   Normalising the CES bundle by the mass of varieties N to switch off the variety effect in the aggregate, as, 
for example, in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), does not affect the results.   6
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e u u  when  u is very 
close to zero and e is very low.   
 
    Each firm takes P, Y, N, u, t and b as given and chooses its ‘efficiency wage’  j w  and 
price  j p  so as to maximise its profit 
  j j j j j l w y p − = π , (8) 
subject to the demand function in (3) and the labour requirement function in (6), as well as 
taking account of its workers’ reaction to the choice of  j w  which is given by the effort 
function in (7).  The first order conditions are  0 / = j j w ∂ π ∂  and  0 / = j j p ∂ π ∂  whose 
solution imply the following wage and price setting rules















= , (10) 
where σ = s/(s – 1).  Equation (9) is a well-known result in the efficiency wage literature and 
implies that firm raises its wage rate up to the point where the effort function is unit elastic in 
real wage.  Equation (10) is the usual mark-up pricing rule for a monopolistically competitive 
firm.  In a symmetric equilibrium where all firms are identical, we drop the subscript j and 
write the above equations as  
  ω e P w e ) / ( = , (9´)   
  ) / ( P w e σ = , (10´) 
                                                 
4   The second order conditions are satisfied as long as s>1 and  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ ω j e .   7
    Totally differentiating (7), (9´) and (10´) with respect to the endogenous variables e, 
w/P, t/P, and u, taking account of  () / wtbP ω =− − , and solving the resulting equations we 
obtain (see Appendix A2 for details of derivation)  







u − = . (11) 
Thus, under our assumptions regarding the shape of the effort function, (11) implies that 
de/du>0 always holds, which is consistent with the theoretical consensus that the net result of 
an increase in unemployment rate is to raise workers’ effort level.  We can use this result to 
examine the way in which equilibrium output and unemployment are related to each other on 
the supply side in the aggregate.  Using the definition of aggregate supply and imposing 
symmetry, the aggregate production function is   
  λ N eL dj y Y
N j







jdj L L  is total employment.  Equation (12) traces the combinations of aggregate 
employment and output in the short-run − i.e. (L,Y) for any given number of firms N − which 
satisfy the supply side equilibrium in which labour productivity is determined by an effort 
supply function and firms pay wages to induces workers to supply the effort level that 
maximises their profits.  Or, put differently, these combinations of L  and  Y give the 
equilibrium locus that describes how Y changes as workers respond to changes in u while the 
firms adjust their wage and price to ensure the resulting effort supply and quantity produced 
maximise profits.   
   Given  that  (1 ) LL F u =− , where is LF labour force, and treating LF, N and λ as 
exogenous








− − ∝ ) 1 ( . (13) 
Thus, provided that de/du, which is given by equation (11), is finite as  1 → u , we would 
expect the right-hand-side of (13) to be negative for sufficiently large levels of u.  
Conversely, starting from sufficiently low levels of u, we would expect the right-hand-side of 
(13) to be positive as long as de/du is positive, as explained above.  Given these and 
                                                 
5   N is endogenous in the long-run whereby free entry and exit determine N such that profits are eliminated.  It 
is easy to verify that the imposition of the long-run equilibrium does not affect the shape of the relationship 
between aggregate supply and unemployment rate derived here.    8
assuming that de/du in (11) is continuous in u, the equilibrium locus in (u, Y) space will be 
similar to that illustrated in Figure 1 above.   
    The main implication of the above model that we wish to stress is that it results in a 
change in dY/du from negative to positive as unemployment rate falls below a certain 
threshold,  u u = .  This is the rate of unemployment at which output attains its highest level, 
Y Y = .  At such a point, the economy may be said to be operating without any slack despite 
supporting a level of unemployment.  Within the region where  u u > , output and 
unemployment rate are negatively related and there is no conflict the implications of Okun’s 
Law.  This situation corresponds to the high-effort state where the economy can be said to be 
operating efficiently and firms will have to employ more workers to meet a rise in aggregate 
demand.  In contrast, the region where  u u <  corresponds to the low-effort state in which the 
economy may be said to be operating inefficiently.  In this situation a higher level of output 
can be achieved at a lower level of employment since firms will find it more profitable to 
meet the rise in demand by inducing the workers to raise their (optimal) effort supply.  Thus, 
the fact that Okun’s law holds − in that a fall in Y is seen to be accompanied by a rise in u − 
when  u u ≤  ought to be the result of shifts in the temporal production function, which could 
have adverse consequences for the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies.  
 
3. Evidence   
In this section we examine data on the level of output and the rate of unemployment from G7 
countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US − in order to check whether 
evidence supports the existence of a nonlinear relationship such as that in Figure 1.  More 
specifically, we have explored the strength of evidence to address the following questions: 
 
(i)   Does an ‘inversed U-shape’ specification adequately explain the way output is 
related to unemployment rate at any point in time?  If so, then, 
 
(ii)   how does the actual rate of unemployment intertemporally compare with the 
threshold rate of unemployment which separates low-effort from high-effort 
states of production and corresponds to peak output?   
 
    To tackle this task, we have estimated a state space ‘local linear trend’ model using 
the Kalman-filter approach .  The regression model consists of the measurement equation, 
 
  t t t t t t t u u Y ε δ φ α + + + =
2 , (14)   9
which assumes that output is a quadratic function
6 of the unemployment rate subject to an 
additive stationary random disturbance term  ()
2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε iidn t , while allowing the (state) 
parameters  () t t t δ φ α , ,  to evolve randomly according to appropriate transition equations 
which we assume to be as follows  
  ( )
2
1 1 , 0 ~ ; ζ σ ζ ζ β α α iidn t t t t t + + = − − , (15) 
  () 1 0 , , 0 ~ ;
2
1 < < + = − θ σ ξ ξ θβ β ξ iidn t t t t , (16) 
  ( )
2
1 , 0 ~ ; η σ η η φ φ iidn t t t t + = − , (17) 
  ()
2
1 , 0 ~ ; ψ σ ψ ψ δ δ iidn t t t t + = − . (18) 
 
  The generality allowed by this set up is particularly useful when it is applied to bivariate 
relationships which both: (a) involve variables that have strong secular pattern and/or are 
subject to cyclical fluctuations
7; and (b) are, by construction, restricted and fail to condition 
explicitly on a host of other potentially relevant variables
8.  The state-space representations, 
in this context, are very flexible since the non-stationary processes generating  t φ  and  t δ  are 
allowed to evolve in a manner capable of capturing any fundamental changes, which may 
have occurred in the historical relationship between Yt and ut.  Moreover, to account for 
trends in output growth and the unemployment rate over our estimation period (1960-2001), 
we have allowed for local linear trends where both the level,  1 t α −  and the slope,  1 t β −  vary 
over time
9.  To estimate (14) allowing for (15)-(18), we require starting values for the state 
vector and its variance-covariance matrix, () 0 0 0 0 , , , δ φ β α  and  0 Σ .  In the absence of any 
                                                 
6   While there are a wide variety of alternative non-linear functions capable of capturing the non-monotonic 
link between Yt and ut predicted by our theory, we have opted for the simplest and most parsimonious of 
these.  
7   Both output and unemployment have these properties and the estimation method adopted here is a superior 
alternative to isolating the secular and cyclical components by filtering the series before checking how they 
relate to each other over time.  
8   In the absence of any explicit dynamics, we employ contemporaneous values of both output and the 
unemployment rate.  This approach might reasonably be expected to yield biased parameter estimates, given 
the joint endogenity of the variables.  To assess the extent of this bias we also experimented with IV and 
GMM estimation and found any biases to be quantitatively negligible. To preserve space, these latter results 
are not reported here but will be made available on request. 
9   Note that in contrast to the other parameters which follow random walks, 
t β  is assumed to follow a 
stationary AR(1) process.  This assumption is employed since a non-stationary process for this parameter 
would imply Yt ~ I(2).  This, however, is against the widely acknowledged stylised fact that the growth rate of 
output is stationary, which is also supported by our data set.  For example, univariate evidence based on 
ADF, weighted-symmetric and Phillips-Perron tests suggest that yt has only one unit root (this evidence is not 
presented here but will be make available on request).   10
prior information on the initial distribution
10, we have employed a diffuse prior which 
involves setting the starting values of the coefficients equal to zero and letting 
0 I Σκ =  where I is the conformable unit matrix and κ  is a very large number (see Harvey, 
1989, for detail). 
    Empirical support for our theory, within the context of the questions (i) and (ii) posed 
above, at the beginning of this section, requires that:  
(i)′  t φ  must be significantly greater than zero,  t δ  must be significantly less than 
zero, the estimated residuals,  t ε ˆ , must be stationary, and the threshold rate of 
unemployment, denoted by  t u  and given by  ) 2 /( t t t u δ φ − =  from the quadratic 
function in (14), should be significantly greater than zero.  
 
(ii)′   Evidence should indicate that in addition to  t t u u > ,  t t u u =  and  t t u u <  have 
also occurred significantly over the sample period. 
 
To examine these, we obtained filtered estimates of the state vector for each of the G7 
countries.  Data are quarterly over the period 1960:Q1-2001:Q1 and the results are reported 
in Table 1 below.  Columns (I), (III) and (V) give, respectively, the filtered estimates of  t φ , 
t δ  and the implied threshold rate of unemployment  t t t u δ φ 2 / − = , for the final observation 
(t=T).  Columns (II), (IV) and (VI) report, respectively, the proportion of observations over 
the estimation period for which the null hypotheses  0 > t φ , 0 < t δ  and  0 > t u  cannot be 
rejected at the 5% critical level.  These results, together with the satisfactory behaviour of the 
estimated residuals  t ε ˆ  (standard tests not reported here but available on request), suggest that 
the quadratic specification in which the peak output occurs at a plausible level of 
unemployment is consistent with data, beyond any co- and/or counter-movements due to 
secular and/or cyclical patterns in the underlying series.  Moreover, since for each t one of the 
three cases  t t u u > ,  t t u u =  or  t t u u <  will have to hold, it is helpful to compare the actual and 
the estimated threshold levels of unemployment.  Table 2 below reports the percentage of 
significant occurrences of these cases at 5% and at 10% critical levels.  According to the 
results only German data provides a strong support for  t t u u > ; US, Canada, Italy and Japan 
fully reject  t t u u >  while UK and to a much lesser extent France show a mild tendency 
towards exhibiting  t t u u > . 
                                                 
10  Given that three of the four transition equations are non-stationary, the unconditional distribution of the state 
vector is not defined.   11
  
Table 1.  Selected results from estimation of equation (14) 
based on quarterly 1964-2001 data for G7 countries   
 
(I) 
T φ ˆ  
(II) 
0 > t φ  
(III) 
T δˆ  
(IV) 
0 > t δ  
(V) 
t u ˆ  
(VI) 
0 > t u  
US  2.49 
(0.232)  100%  -0.250 
(0.036)  100%  5.62 
(1.21)  100% 
Canada  2.26 
(0.223)  100%  -0.124 
(0.022)  100%  9.14 
(2.26)  92% 
UK  2.47 
(0.640)  100%  -0.158* 
(0.178)  100%  8.02* 
(5.03)  95% 
France  4.73 
(0.776)  100%  -0.258 
(0.124)  100%  9.13 
(2.13)  80% 
Germany  21.06 
(4.60)  100%  -2.47 
(0.593)  100%  4.26 
(0.07)  100% 
Italy  4.75 
(0.560)  100%  -0.224 
(0.082)  100%  10.58 
(2.77)  98% 
Japan  4.26 
(1.04)  100%  -0.585 
(0.231)  96%  3.65 
(0.59)  85% 
(1)  French data do not start until 1964:Q4. The initial 4 years (16 observations) were used to 
allow the filtered estimates sufficient time to stabilise and were excluded in obtaining 
estimates in this table. The local linear trend components were not significant for German 
data and hence were excluded in final estimation for that country.     
(2) The statistical significances of  ˆ
t φ  and  ˆ
t δ  in columns (I) and (III) are based on their 
asymptotic standard errors (the numbers in parentheses). An asterisk indicates not 
significant at the 5% level.  To assess the statistical significance of  ˆ
t u  on a period-by-
period basis we have conducted a parametric bootstrap using 2000 replications for each 
quarter. The numbers is parentheses are the bootstrapped standard errors for the final 
period.  An asterisk indicates not significant at the 5% level.  
 
 
Table 2.  Comparison between the actual and threshold levels of unemployment  
  proportion of  t t u u <   proportion of  t t u u =   proportion of  t t u u >  



















































The above evidence is also in line with the findings reported by studies that have 
examined the behaviour of labour productivity in connection with employment and output in 
the industrialised countries and provide evidence on the way in which labour productivity has 
changed over the last few decades.  Recent examples include Disney, et al. (2000), Barnes   12
and Haskel (2000), Marini and Scaramozzino (2000), van Ark et al. (2000) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1996).  The evidence provided in these studies is usually interpreted using either direct 
causes − which are the standard reasons for productivity gains, i.e. i) improved skill due to 
training; ii) increased efficiency due to progress in management and restructuring; and iii) 
rising physical productivity of other factors of production due to R&D, etc. − or the indirect 
causes whereby market forces induce a rise in efficiency that is needed in order for the firms 
to survive competition and market selection.  The separating line between these two accounts, 
however, is not very clear in the sense that the latter will have to be achieved through the 
former when the economy is operating efficiently.  But if the economy happens to be in an 
inefficient phase, market forces can act directly without having to induce any of the factors in 
the first category.  The efficiency wage hypothesis argument used in this paper is a typical 
example of this case.  Moreover, given our definition of the threshold rate of unemployment 
− that separates the efficient and inefficient phases of production − and the evidence in Table 
2 above that in a number of countries the actual unemployment rate has a tendency to 
coincide with a time varying estimate of such a threshold rate, exploring the links between 
this concept and the time-varying NAIRU − for example as that studied by Gordon (1997b) − 
can throw light on the determination of the natural rate of output and hence provides an 
interesting direction for future research.   
 
4.   Summary and Conclusions 
The main motivating factor underlying our study has been the fact that in some circumstances 
a positive policy shock might give rise to adverse employment effects.  We have develop a 
model which shows that if firms can use the threat of unemployment to induce workers to 
supply more effort, the supply side relationship between aggregate output and unemployment 
rate will be non-monotonic.  In particular, these variables can be positively related if the gain 
in productivity is sufficiently large to outweigh the negative effect of the reduction in 
employment.  In such circumstances, an expansionary policy will have an adverse effect on 
unemployment.  Our evidence, based on data from G7 countries over the period 1960-2001, 
shows strong support for the non-monotonicity implied by our model.  Using an estimation 
method which allows for trends, cyclical changes and breaks, we find that only German data 
strongly favour a persistent negative relationship between the level of output and rate of 
unemployment.     13
Clearly, our results – which complement those of the literature on the effects of 
contractionary fiscal policy (Barry and Devereux, 1995) and on the positive effects of 
unemployment insurance (Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000) – suggest that plausible 
circumstances do exist in which market imperfections pose serious obstacles to the smooth 
working of expansionary and/or stabilization policies.    
   14
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6. Appendix   
A1.   Derivation of the Effort Supply Function, e(ω, u) 
This appendix explains how a specific effort supply function such as that in equation (7) can 
be derived within the framework of the efficiency wage hypothesis where, following 
common practice, the agent (consumer/worker) is assumed to maximise the expected utility 
of remaining in employment.  
We assume that all agents participate in the labour market and at any point in time an 
individual agent can be in one of the following states: (i) employed (working); (ii) being fired 
(when caught shirking at work); (iii) unemployed (being without a job); or (iv) being hired 
(finding a job).  Let the utility indices corresponding to the above states be denoted as 
follows: 
(i) employed  (working):  V
E 
(ii) being  fired  (losing one’s job): V
F  
(iii)  unemployed (being without a job): V
U 
(iv)  being hired (finding a job): V
H  
 
  It is straightforward to derive V
U and V
E.  For simplicity, here we approximate these 
by the indirect utility of a typical agent at any point in time, which can be written as 
() e f m V ⋅ − = λ .  m is the real disposable income of the agent from work; normalising the 
price level P to unity, mwt =−  (net of tax real wage) and mb =  (real benefit) for employed 
and unemployed agents, respectively.  The function  () 0 ≥ e f  captures the disutility of effort 
e;  λ=1 and λ= 0 for employed and unemployed agents, respectively, and we assume that 
0 > ′ f  and  0 ≥ ′ ′ f  which imply that the disutility of effort rises with a non-decreasing rate.  
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we shall use the explicit form 
2 ) ( ke e f =  
where k>0 is a scaling factor.  Thus,  
  b V
U = , (A1.1) 
  ()
2 ke t w V
E − − = . (A1.2) 
  We assume that V
H, which is the satisfaction a consumer attaches to finding a job or 
being hired is in principle not distinguishable from V




The probabilities associated with moving from one state to another are assumed to be 
determined as follows:    17
(a) Probability associated with being fired when shirking, F.  
We assume that shirking is the only reason for being fired (we do not explicitly model the 
monitoring technology).  Therefore, ceteris paribus, F is a monotonic function of the effort 
level, e. Thus,  
  () () () 0 ; 0 1 ; 1 0 ; < ′ = = = F F F e F F .  
For simplicity, normalise the maximum possible effort to unity and let  
 F  =  1 – e.  (A1.4) 
 
(b)   Probability associated with finding a job, or being hired, when unemployed, H.  
We assume that the labour force is homogeneous and, ceteris paribus, H is a monotonic 
function of the unemployment rate, u (we do not explicitly model the search technology). 
Thus,  
  () () ( ) 0 ; 0 1 ; 1 0 ; < ′ = ≤ = H H H u H H . 
For simplicity we let  
 H  =  1 – u.   (A1.5) 
 
    We define the optimal level of effort as that which maximises a household’s expected 
utility of remaining in employment. The latter is denoted by R(e) and is, by definition, given 
by 
 R (e) = (1 – F)V
E + FV
F. (A1.6) 
Also, given that a ‘fired’ worker can either be hired or remain unemployed, we let V
F be a 
weighted average of V
H  and  V
U. Thus,  
 V
F = HV
H + (1 – H)V
U. (A1.7) 
Equations (A1)-(A7) yield  
  () ub t w u e b t w u ke u uke e R + − − + − − + − − − = ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
2 3 . (A1.8) 
The agent takes (w, t, b, u)  as given and chooses e to maximise R(e).  The first order 
condition for this is  () ( ) 0 ) ( 3 / 1 / ) 1 )( 3 / 2 (
2 = − − + − − − b t w k e u u e .  This has two roots of 
which only one is positive, which also satisfies the second order for a maximum and can, 





























γω ω , (A1.9)   18
where ω = (w - t - b) and γ ≡ 3/k.  It is clear that equation (A1.9) satisfies our specified 
conditions since  0 ) 1 , 0 ( 0 ) , ( = ∈ ∀ = ω ω as u u e ;  0 0 ) , ( > > ω ω as u e ;  0 > ω e ;  
0 > u e ;  0 < ω ω e ;  0 > u eω ; and  0 > u u e  for small values of u, as required.  
 
A2.   Derivation of Equations (11).  
Equation (11) is derived from equations (7), (9´) and (10´) and the definition 
() / jj wt bP ω =− − , which are reproduced below as (A2.1)-(A2.4), respectively, where we 
have normalised P = 1 and dropped subscript j. 
  ) , ( u e e ω = , (A2.1) 
  ω e w e = , (A2.2) 
  w e σ = , (A2.3) 
  b t w − − = ω . (A2.4) 
Totally differentiating the above, treating e, ω, u, w and t as endogenous (note that t ought to 
be treated as endogenous when the government fixes b since variations in u can cause a 
budget deficit or surplus), we obtain  
  () du e dt dw e de u + − = ω , (A2.5) 
  () ( ) du e dt dw e w dw e de u ω ω ω ω + − + = , (A2.6) 
  dw de σ = , (A2.7) 
  dt dw d − = ω . (A2.8) 
Given that (A2.2) and (A2.3) imply  σ ω = e , (A2.7) can be used to write (A2.5) and (A2.6) as  
  0 = + − du e dt u σ , (A2.9) 
and 
  () 0 = + − du e dt dw e u ω ω ω . (A2.10) 
Solving these yields  





,   (A2.11) 
and 






dw u u . (A2.12) 
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